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Is Price Waterhouse
A Help to Victims of
Sex Discrimination?
Given disarray among the justices, a
stable precedent will not emerge until it
is decided what proof will be required of
defendants to show the same result
would have occurred absent
discrimination.
BY N. THOMPSON POWERS
The Supreme Court s May 1 decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkin  is
good news for employment-
discrimination plaintiffs generally, al¬
though it reverse  the favorable judgment
the plaintiff received in the lower courts.
In that case, the Court held that Ann
Hopkins did not have to prove she would
have been promoted to partnership in the
accounting firm but for sex discrimina¬
tion. She could prevail if she established
that discrimination was a  motivating
part  or  substantial factor  in the firm s
decision and if Price Waterhouse failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision
in the absence of discrimination.
Just how good the Price Waterhouse
news is for plaintiffs is still unclear for at
least two reasons: First, two of the six jus¬
tices who supported the decision refused
to join in the o inion of the other four and
separately e pressed serious disagreement
with that opinion. Second, the practical
effect of shifting the burden of    but for’ ’
causation to the defendants in  mixed
motives  cases cases where both legi¬
timate and illegitimate reasons led to the
employment decision remains to be
seen. The evidence plaintiffs must show to
prove that discrimination played a sig¬
nificant part in the employer’s action will
of course be important, but the kind and
amount of proof defendants must present
to establish that the result would have been
the same if there had been no discrimina¬
tion may be even more critical.
Early in the plurality opinion, Justice
William Brennan Jr. stated that in this
case, “as often happens, the truth lies
somewhere in between  the parties’
claims as to their respective burdens of
proof. Indeed, given the disarray among
the justices,  truth,  in the form of a
stable precedent on this issue, may also lie
somewhere  in between  the four opin¬
ions the justices expressed in this case.
The case came before the Supreme
Court  fter both the District Court and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir¬
cuit found that Price Waterhouse had dis¬
criminated against Hopkins under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, first in defer¬
ring her consideration for partnership and
then in not reconsidering her.
Sexual Stereotyping
Judge Gerhard Gesell, who tried the
case, ruled in Hopkins’ favor on the issue
of liability. His decision was based in part
on a determination that the all-male group
of partners who performed her evaluation
reflected unconscious “sexual stereo¬
typing  in criticizing her interpersonal
skills. This meant that to some extent the
men were more critical of assertive be¬
havior in women than in men because they
regarded it as unfeminine..
Judge Gesell also determined that Price
Waterhouse’s process for partnership
evaluation gave  substantial  weight to
the stereotyping comments made about
Hopkins and that the partnership had
failed to address the  conspicuous”
problem of sexual stereotyping in its
evaluation process.
Judge Gesell concluded that each of
these factors  might have been innocent
alone,  but they combined to produce
discrimination. Having found that dis¬
crimination played a role in blocking the
plaintiff’s election to partnership
(although he could not say that she would
have been elected but for such discrimina¬
tion), Judge Gesell declared that she was
entitled to relief unless Price Waterhouse
demonstrated by  clear and convincing
evidence [which it had not done] that the
decision would have been the same absent
discrimination. 
On appeal, a divided panel of the D.C.
Circuit affirmed Judge GeselTs findings
that sexual stereotyping had played a role
in Price Waterhouse’s evaluation of the
plaintiff and that this constituted unlawful
discrimination. The majority also declared
that Price Waterhouse could have escaped
liability only by showing through clear
and convincing evidence that discrimina¬
tion was not the determinative factor in the
plaintiff’s non-election to partnership. The
partnership, the appeal  court stated, had
not made such a showing.
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion,
joined by Justices. Thurgood Marshall,
Hairy Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens,
upheld key parts of the lower courts’ find¬
ings. Justice Brennan recognized that Title
VII incorporates both prohibitions against
sex, race, and certain other types of dis¬
crimination in employment decision¬
making and the need for em loyers to be
free to decide the qualities and character¬
istics they will consider in these decisions.
From this, he reasoned that the prohibition
on discrimination  because of  sex, face,
and the like is not limited to situations in
which discrimination is shown to be the
determinative cause in a decision, but also
includes situations in which discrimination
was a factor or was relied on when the
challenged decision was made. To give
effect to Title VII’s other aspects 
preservation of the employer s remaining
freedom of choice  Justice Brennan also
concluded that an employer  shall not be
liable if it can prove that, even if it had not
taken gender into account, it would have
come to the same decision. 
Mi e -Motive Situations
Justice Brennan then declared that
placing this burden on employers was not
incon istent with such prior decisions as
Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), in which
the employer did not have to prove that its
stated explanation for the challenged em¬
ployment decision was the true reason for
its action. The difference, Brennan con¬
clude , was that while Price Waterhouse
raised such pretext issues, it also presented
a situation in which the challenged action
was the product of both legitimate and il-
iv i'tir .ate reasons. In such mixed-motive
situations, Justice Brennan said, the
plaintiff retained the burden to show that
iscrimination “played a part  in the ac¬
tion and, if she carried that burden, the
employer had a burden that could be con¬
sidered an affirmative defense to prove it
would have taken the same action if dis¬
crimination had not been present. Justice
Brennan noted, that his analysis was con¬
sistent with such prior decisions as Mount
Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977) that involved mixed-
motives situations.
Justice Brennan also stated that  in
most cases, the employer should be able to
present objective evidence as to its prob¬
able decision  absent discrimination. He
pointed out that in mixed-motives cases an
employer cannot prevail by offering legi¬
timate and sufficient reasons that did not
motivate it at the time of its decision.
Justice Brennan concluded, however,
that the employer is not required to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have made the same decision absent
discrimination. Instead, it need only make
such a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence. As support for this conclusion.
Justice Brennan pointed out that  [c]on-
ventional rules of civil litigation generally
apply to Title VII cases,  that “one of
these rules is that parties to civil litigation
need only prove their case by a pre¬
ponderance of the evidence.  He note 
that  [ejxceptions to this standard . . . are
ordinarily recognized only when the gov¬
ernment seeks to take . . . action more
dramatic than entering an award of . . .
conventional relief against an individual.  
Justices Byron White and Sandra Day
O’Connor concurred separately in the
Court’s judgement. White’s opinion was
short. He agreed with the plurality that the
Court’s decision in this case did not  re¬
quire modification  of its holdings in
Burdine and McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But he em¬
phasized that Mount Healthy provided the
proper approach to mixed-motives cases
and considered it unnecessary to go be¬
yond that decision as Justice Brennan
had in reaching the issue of whether the
case involved the use of  but for  causa¬
tion or created an “affirmative defense 
for employers. He also disagree  with the
plurality’s analysis that an employer
shoul  generally be able to present objec¬
tive evidence as to the decision it woul 
have made absent discrimination. Justice
White said that credible testimony on that
subject should be     ample proof. ’ ’
Justice O Connor’s concurrence was
much longer. She agreed with the plurality
and Justice White that the plaintiff had
pro uced sufficient evidence in this case
to shift the burden of persuasion to the
employer and that, to satisfy its burden,
the employer would have to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision in
the absence of discrimination. But she
emphasized that the burden of persuasion
should only shift to the employer when the
plaintiff had produced  evidence suf¬
ficient to show that an illegitimate crite¬
rion was a substantial factor in the  ar¬
ticular employment decision such that a
reasonable fact finder could draw an in¬
ference that the decision was made  be¬
cause of  the plaintiffs protected status. 
And O’Connor agreed with the dissenters,
that the Court’s decision in Price Water-
house was  at least a,change in direction
from some of our prior precendents. ’ ’
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent,
joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Antonin Scalia, declared that
the Court’s decision was a  manipula¬
tion  of complex evidentiary rules in
employment-discrimination cases in a way
that was certain to result in confusion. The
dissent also sought to minimize the deci¬
sion’s scope by construing it as a shift in
the burden of persuasion to the employer
only where a plaintiff proves by direct
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evidence that an unlawful motive  as a
substantial factor actually relied on in
making the decision. 
Heightened Awareness
Although the practical significance of
the Price Waterhouse decision will depend
on the definition given to the respective
burdens of proofs plaintiffs and defendants
will shoulder in mixed-motives cases, the
ruling should force employers to be more
careful and vigorous in promoting un¬
biased decision-making and in identifying
and rejecting bias when it is expressed. As
with sex harassment, heightened aware¬
ness of the problem should contribute
significantly td its elimination. Yet the
objective is to secure unbiased decision¬
making not simply to eliminate the ex¬
pression of bias. Unless that is kept in
mind, prejudice may be hidden in less
candid evaluations and counseling.
Together with the Court s decision last
term in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust Co., 487 U.S. _ (1988), Price Wa¬
terhouse will also undoubtedly complicate
trials of Title VII cases involving sub-
As with sex  arassment, heightened
awareness of the problem should
contribute to its elimination. Yet the
objective is to secure unbiased
decision-makin  not simply to
eliminate the expression of bias.
jective decision-making. In Watson, the
Supreme Court held that subjective deci¬
sion-making could be challenged under
disparate impact as well as disparate
treatment analysis. Under disparate impact
analysis, a plaintiff can prevail if she
shows that one or more aspects of an em¬
ployer s practice have adversely affected
her and have a statistically significant ad-
verse impact on her race or sex
grou  assuming the employer can not
justify its use of the challenged practices.
Now, as a result of Price Waterho se,
plaintiffs may pursue as many as three
lines of attack on subjective decision¬
making: First, disparate impact when there
is sufficient statistical evidence of adverse
impact to support it. Second, Burdine-type
disparate treatment in which the em¬
ployer’s justification will be challenged.
Third, mixed motivation when dis¬
crimination can be shown to have been a
substantial factor in the decision.
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provide a further indication of the reser¬
vations that both Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor have about affirmative action.
In his dissent. Justice Kennedy stated that
consistency in the allocation of burdens of
proof in Title VII cases would demand that
those challenging the validity of af¬
firmative-action plans no longer bear the
burden of proving that they were illegal.
Justice O’Connor agreed. This could be a
critical shift that makes it more difficult
for employers to defend affir ative-action
plans. Justice O’Connor and Justice
Kennedy’s predecessor, Justice Lewis
Powell Jr., were part of the six-justice
majority that reaffirmed the lawfulness of
employer-adopted affirmative-action plans
when the Court last considered that issue
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616(1987).
Finally, it remains to be seen whether
the Court will subsequently hold that the
preponderance of the evidence  stand¬
ard ennunciated in Price Waterhouse app¬
lies not only when the employer is seeking
to escape liability in mixed-motives cases,
but also when it is seeking to avoid pro¬
viding relief to in ividual member  of a
class found to have been discriminated
against. Most of plurality opinion’s ra¬
tionale for applying this standard in Price
Waterhouse seems equally applicable in
such cases. Moreover, as stated by Justice
O’Connor in her concurring opinion, a
plaintiff who has shown that discrimina¬
tion was a substantial factor in an adverse
action taken against her has proven more
than has been proven about the individual
members of a successful class action. In
such cases, it may therefore seem in¬
congruous to apply a heavier burden to
employers in the later type of cases than in
the former.
When the Court addresses the issue of
which burden of proof to apply to deter¬
mine whether individual members of a
class should receive relief, it should con¬
sider whether imposing a preponderance
of the evidence or a clear and convincing
evidence burden is more consistent with
the directive in §706(g) that indivi¬
dual relief should not be provided under
Title VII when the adverse action was
taken  for any reason other than
discrimination. 
Price Waterhouse is an important deci¬
sion in the still-evolving field of em-
ploymerf-discrimination law. Its ultimate
significance cannot be determined, how¬
ever, until the questions it raises or leaves
unresolved are answered.
N. Thompson Powers is a resident
partner in the Phoenix office of Steptoe &
Jo n on.
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